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Can Compulsory Military Service Raise Civilian Wages? 
Evidence from the Peacetime Draft in Portugal
* 
 
Although the practice of military conscription was widespread during most of the past century, 
credible evidence on the effects of mandatory service is limited. Angrist (1990) showed that 
the Vietnam-era draft in the U.S. lowered the early-career wages of conscripts, a finding he 
attributed to the low value of military experience. More recent studies have found a mixed 
pattern of effects, with both negative (the Netherlands) and positive (in Sweden) earnings 
impacts. Even among Vietnam era draftees, Angrist and Chen (2011) find that the net effect 
on earnings by age 50 is close to zero. We provide new evidence on the long-term impacts of 
peacetime conscription in a “low education” labor market, using longitudinal data for 
Portuguese men born in 1967. These men were inducted at a relatively late age (21), 
allowing us to use pre- conscription wages as a control for potential ability differences 
between conscripts and non- conscripts. Our estimates of the average impact of military 
service for men who had entered the labor market by age 21 are slightly positive (1-2 
percent) but not significantly different from zero throughout the period from 2 to 20 years after 
their service. These small average effects arise from a significantly positive later-life impact 
for men with only primary education, coupled with a zero-effect for men with higher 
education. The positive impacts for less-educated men suggest that mandatory service can 
be a valuable experience for poorly-educated men who might otherwise spend their careers 
in low-level jobs. 
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Throughout the 20th Century young men in most Western countries faced the risk of military
conscription. Although compulsory service ended in the U.S. in 1973, the practice continued until
very recently in many European nations, and is still widely used around the world.1 Spurred in part
by recent decisions to end conscription in Sweden, Italy, France, and Germany, there is renewed
interest in understanding the impacts of mandatory service on a wide range of outcomes, including
earnings (Angrist and Chen, 2011; Angrist, Chen, and Song, 2011; Grenet et al., 2011; Palayo,
2010), education (Maurin and Xenogiani, 2007; Cipollone and Rosolia, 2007; Keller et al., 2009;
Bauer et al., 2009), health (Bedard and Deschenes, 2006; Dobkin, 2009; Autor et al., 2011), and
crime (Galliani et al., 2011).
Revealed preference arguments suggest that conscripts will suer economic losses from coerced
service (e.g., Oi, 1967). Nevertheless, a number of analysts have argued that compulsory service
could have a positive return for disadvantaged youth who face limited civilian job opportunities
(e.g., Berger and Hirsch,1983; de Tray, 1982).2 Seminal research by Angrist (1990) showed that
military service reduced the earnings of Vietnam-era draftees, a nding he attributed to the low
value of military experience in the civilian labor market. Subsequent research in the U.S. and other
countries, however, has uncovered a surprisingly mixed pattern of impacts. Imbens and van der
Klaauw (1995) found that 10 years after conscription Dutch veterans earned lower wages than those
who avoided service. In contrast, Albrecht et al. (1999) estimated a persistent positive earnings
premium for Swedish conscripts. Grenet et al. (2011) nd no long-run impact on the wages of
British conscripts; likewise, Bauer et al. (2009) nd no eect for West German conscripts.3 In a
recent re-analysis of the Vietnam-era draftees, Angrist and Chen (2011) nd that by age 50 they
have about the same earnings as non-draftees, though slightly higher education.
In this paper we present new evidence on the long-run eects of mandatory military service,
using detailed longitudinal data for Portuguese men born in the late 1960s. Several features of the
1In Europe, for example, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Norway, and Switzerland all still
require men to perform some form of national service. Russia and China also have mandatory military
service.
2A similar argument was made by Bonn (1916) regarding the impact of compulsory military service on
the career prospects for German men from rural areas. He asserted that "...the average German peasant
who has served his term is a brighter and better man than he would have been without it." Bonn (1916, p.
61).
3Kunze (2002) analyzes longitudinal data for German workers and nds a complex pattern of earnings
premiums for veterans.
1Portuguese setting and the available data make this evidence particularly valuable. First, these
men were drafted at age 21 for a period of up to 2 years of (non-wartime) service. Second, they had
relatively low levels of education { mean completed schooling at age 20 for Portuguese men born in
1967 was only 6.9 years.4 The low levels of schooling and late age of conscription meant that many
men had already entered full time work prior to their service, allowing us to use pre-enlistment
wages to control for unobserved ability dierences between those who served and those who did
not. Third, the draft was designed to sta the military, and not as a universal social program:
thus only about 40 percent of the men in the cohort were drafted. A fourth unique feature is the
availability of high-quality administrative data spanning the period from 1986 to 2009. This data
set { known as the Quadros de Pessoal (QP) { provides wage and hours information at a specic
point in time each year for all private-sector wage earners in the economy. We use these data to
track the cohorts of interest from their initial entry into the labor market until middle age. We also
exploit the richness of the QP data to identify individuals who were drafted into military service,
using the fact that workers who left a job to serve in the military were legally treated as being on
leave of absence.
Our empirical analysis shows that the average impact of military service for men who had
entered the labor market by age 21 is weakly positive but close to zero throughout the period
from 2 to 20 years after their service. This small average eect, however, masks a statistically
signicant later-life impact of about 4-5% for men with lower levels of education (under 6 years
of schooling), coupled with a zero-eect for men with higher education. The positive impact for
the less-educated group mirrors the ndings for U.S. veterans by Berger and Hirsch (1983) and
conrms that mandatory service can be a valuable experience for disadvantaged men who might
otherwise spend their careers in low-level jobs. Our condence in these ndings is bolstered by two
important additional results. On one hand, we nd little evidence of selection on unobserved ability
in the induction process that governed conscription in the late 1980s in Portugal. Consequently,
estimates of the impact of military service on post-service earnings are relatively robust to dierent
assumptions about the relative impact of unobserved ability dierences in pre-conscription versus
post-conscription earnings. On the other hand, we nd that by 7 or 8 years after the completion of
their service conscripts have virtually the same private sector employment rate as non-conscripts,
4Portugal ranks last in average schooling achievement among the members of the European Union (Barro
and Lee, 2010).
2alleviating concerns about selection bias due to dierential employment rates of veterans and non-
veterans.
The next section of the paper provides a brief overview of the institutional background underly-
ing the conscription process in Portugal in the late 1980s. Section 2 discusses the QP data set and
our method for identifying conscripts, based on unpaid leave-of-absence status. We then provide
a comparison of the enlisted, the non-enlisted, and other individuals in the birth cohort under
analysis. Section 4 presents the details of our statistical approach, which takes advantage of the
availability of pre-conscription earnings data to control for potential ability dierences between con-
scripts and non-conscripts. Section 5 presents our main ndings, rst using graphical techniques,
then using more formal regression models, including models that explore a range of possible values
for the relative eect of unobserved ability in pre-conscription versus post-conscription earnings.
We also explore possible mechanisms driving the enlistment eect. Section 6 concludes.
1 Military Service in Portugal
During the 1960s and early 1970s Portugal's wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau
necessitated a far-reaching conscription system. Following the overthrow of the Estado Novo regime
in 1974 and the end of the colonial wars, the Portuguese military transitioned to a smaller peacetime
force.5 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s men were at risk of conscription in the year they
turned 21, and draftees were required to serve for a maximum of 2 years.6 Individuals were called
for medical and psychological evaluations in the year they turned 20. Those judged physically or
mentally unt, those convicted of serious felonies, and those deemed to fall short of the "dignity
and good moral standing" required by the military were exempted from service.7 Men could also
petition to be classied as conscientious objectors: if successful, they were required to perform
alternative service (e.g., working in a hospital or local public administration) for a similar period.
Short-term deferments could be granted to students and individuals who were the "sole providers"
for their family, but options for self-selecting out of service altogether were quite limited.
Over the 1990s a series of legal changes lowered the age of conscription to 20 (eective in 1993
for men born in 1973 or later)8 and reduced the duration of service to a maximum of 8 months
5Carrington and de Lima (1996) study the impact of the large number of retornados { Portuguese nationals
who returned at the end of the colonial wars { on labor market conditions in Portugal.
6Law 2135.
7Men with a criminal record but no serious felony conviction served under a special disciplinary regime.
8Law 30/87 and Decree-Law 463/88.
3for the 1971 and 1972 birth cohorts, and to 4 months for those born after 1973.9 Conditions for
deferments and exemptions from service were also gradually eased. Finally, in 2005, peacetime
conscription ended and the Portuguese military became an all-volunteer force open to both men
and women.
Table 1 shows the fractions of men in each year-of-birth cohort from 1965 to 1979 who were
drafted to serve in the military. This fraction ranged from 35 to 50 percent, with a dip for the 1972
and 1973 cohorts, who were both subject to the draft in 1993. Note that military service was far
from universal for the men in these cohorts. Instead, the size of the draft was set to meet the needs
and budget limitations of the military. Each year the Ministry of Defense established a quota for
new enlistees in the Army, Air Force and Navy. The three branches then determined the number of
conscripts needed in various elds of specialization and selected candidates from the lists of eligible
men.10
Once in the military, enlistees could undertake basic skills training as well as occupational
training { for example, as a chef or a truck driver. Labor laws in Portugal specify that occupational
training in the military is equivalent to civilian training, allowing some conscripts to accumulate
transferable human capital during their service.11 Other legislation required employers to treat
drafted men as "on leave" and re-hire them at the end of their service. This may have discouraged
rms from hiring young men until their conscription status was settled. For the men who were
hired and subsequently drafted, however, it presumably eased the transition back to civilian life.
Finally, conscripts in good standing could re-enlist for up to 8 years of additional service, though
this option was not widely exercised during the 1980s and 1990s.
2 Data on Earnings and Conscription Status
The Quadros de Pessoal
Our analysis relies on a unique administrative data set, the Quadros de Pessoal (QP), collected
annually by the Ministry of Employment. The QP is a census of paid workers in the Portuguese
9Law 22/91, Law 30/87, and Decree-Law 463/88. These new regulations on the duration of service
eectively codied practices that were already established. Indeed, by the late 1980s, conscripts were often
discharged earlier than the 24 months established by law.
10In this sense the conscription process was more similar to the process used in the U.S. in the 1960s, prior
to the draft lottery, than to a "universal service" system in countries like France.
11Currently, such equivalence is guaranteed for training courses in the elds of electricity, plumbing, elec-
tronics, metal works, wood and furniture works, rst aid and health support, professional driving, cooking,
bakery, administrative support, music, and graphic design and multimedia.
4private sector: all rms with at least one paid worker are legally obligated to return information on
their full roster of employees, including wages and hours of work during the appropriate reference
week (in March until 1993 and in October since 1994).12 Importantly for our purposes, during
the era of mandatory service the QP asked employers to include men on leave for military duty
in their roster. We assume that these workers are reported with missing values for their earnings
and hours of work in the reference week, and for simplicity refer to such employees as "on leave".13
A limitation of the QP is that government workers { who comprise just under 20 percent of the
Portuguese workforce { are excluded from coverage.14 A second limitation is that the QP provides
only a snapshot of labor market outcomes in each year. Thus, individuals who are unemployed or
out of the labor force at the time of the census have no labor market data for that year. Electronic
records from the QP are available for the period from 1986 to 2009, and include worker and rm
identiers that allow individuals to be tracked over time and across jobs. Worker-level data are
unavailable for 1990 and 2001, creating gaps in the worker histories in those two years.
Information for employees in the QP includes gender, date of birth, current educational at-
tainment, occupation, date of hire, base earnings, supplemental payments, and hours of work.
Information for employers includes industry and location of the rm, gross annual revenues, and
ownership status (foreign or domestic; private versus public). We use an edited version of the
QP that has been checked to verify the consistency of the longitudinal matches (see the Data Ap-
pendix). We measure a worker's gross hourly wage by dividing the sum of the individual's monthly
base-wage and other regularly-paid benets by his or her normal hours of work.15 All wages are de-
ated using the Consumer Price Index (2009=100). We treat as missing any wage observation that
is below 0.75 of the rst percentile of wages in a given year, or above 3 times the 99th percentile.
12Firms are required to post their employee rosters and the corresponding salary information in a public
place visible by its workers, helping to ensure the accuracy of the reported information. During the 1980s
there was some under-coverage in the QP, particularly of small rms (Braguinsky et al., 2011).
13Firms may also fail to report earnings and hours for other reasons, including long-term illnesses, strikes,
and maternity leave { see Table A.1 in the Data Appendix. Unfortunately, the reason for leave status is not
available in the electronic version of the QP.
14Also missing from the employee rosters are contract workers. In recent years such workers have accounted
for a growing share of employment (Rebelo, 2003).
15Reported earnings are net of the employer portion of social security taxes, but include the employee
portion of the tax, currently 11 percent.
5Identifying Conscripts
Ideally we could merge conscription information from military records to the QP and conduct an
analysis of the impacts of compulsory service for several cohorts. Unfortunately, individual service
records are not available. Thus, we have to infer conscription status from the observed data in the
QP. We focus on men inducted before 1993, when the term of service was still two years, and make
use of the fact that employers were instructed to report workers who had been drafted as on leave.
A complication is that some of the conscripts in a given year could be inducted early in the year,
before the March date of the QP, and others could be inducted after the QP was completed. We
therefore identify two separate groups of conscripts: (1) men who are recorded in the QP as working
full time in March of the year they turned 20 years of age, and are "on leave" (i.e., reported with
missing earnings and hours) in the next two years; (2) men who were working full time in March
of the year they turned 21, and were on leave in March in the next year.16 We compare these
two groups to men who were working full time in March of the year they turned 21 and in March
of the following year (and therefore could not have been inducted into the military at age 21 and
served more than a year). Note that we can only identify conscripts and non-conscripts who were
working just before or just after reaching the age of 21. Narrowing the focus to these men has the
important advantage that we have a full-time wage observation for each person at (approximately)
age 21. For conscripts, the wage is measured just prior to entering the military at age 20 or 21; for
non-conscripts, it is measured in the year they turn 21.
To implement these denitions in the QP we need to limit attention to cohorts who reached
the age of 20 in 1986 or later (the rst year QP data are available). Moreover, since the QP has a
gap in 1990, we cannot use data for cohorts born in 1968 or 1969, as their status in the years they
turned 21 or 22 is unknown. Given these constraints, we focus on men born in 1967 as our primary
cohort of interest. This is the only cohort for whom the required data are available and who were
required to serve up to two years in the military if conscripted.
Before proceeding it is important to try to verify that men who were working full time at age
20 or 21 and then recorded as on leave were actually conscripted. While we cannot oer denitive
proof, we conducted a series of comparisons summarized in Figure 1 that we believe are highly
supportive of our assumptions. The upper left hand panel of the gure shows the distribution of
16As a robustness check we consider relaxing the criteria for the rst subgroup slightly by requiring that
they were employed full time in March of the year they turned 20 and on leave in the next March. We show
below this has very little eect on our results.
6activities in each year of age from 18 to 42 for men born in 1967 who were observed working full time
at either age 20 or 21. Notice that the fraction of the cohort reported on leave is relatively high for
only two years { ages 21 and 22 { and that at these ages the sum of the fractions observed working
or on leave is very similar to the fraction observed working at ages 23 and older. This pattern
strongly suggests that leave of absence status is associated with military service. By comparison,
the upper right hand panel shows similar data for women born in 1967 who were observed working
full time at either age 20 or 21. For women there is no "unusual" spike in the fraction on leave at
ages 21 and 22, conrming that the draft is the likely explanation for the high fraction of men on
leave at these ages.
Comparisons with later cohorts of men and women, presented in the middle and lower panels of
the Figure, provide further evidence that men from the 1967 cohort who were on leave at ages 21-22
were in the military. In the middle panels we show data for people born in 1977 who were observed
working full time at age 19 or 20. (We adjust the requirement on age to reect the fact that
conscription occurred at age 20 for this cohort). Consistent with the very short term of military
service for this cohort (4 months maximum) we see only a relatively small rise in the fraction of
men classied as on leave at age 20. For women born in 1977 the patterns look very similar to those
of women born 10 years earlier. Finally, in the lower panels of Figure 1 we show data for men and
women born in 1987 who were observed working full time at age 19 or 20. For this cohort there was
no mandatory military service, and reassuringly only a trivial fraction of men are recorded as on
leave between the ages of 20 and 22. Again, the data for women look relatively similar to the data
for women born 10 or 20 years earlier. Overall, we believe that these comparisons provide strong
support for our use of leave-of-absence status as an indicator of conscription status for men in the
1967 cohort.
3 The 1967 Birth Cohort: Conscripts, Non-Conscripts, and Oth-
ers
Although we are reasonably certain that we can identify conscripts in the 1967 cohort who had
established a strong labor force attachment by age 21, and a comparison group of non-conscripts
with similar early attachment, there are many other men in the cohort whose draft status is
unknown, including men who were working at age 20 or 21 but whose status at age 22 is unknown,
and men who had not yet entered the labor market by age 21. Table 2 presents some comparative
7information on the various subgroups to help contextualize our main groups of interest.
Out of the full cohort of approximately 100,000 men born in Portugal in 1967 (Pordata, 2010),
92% are observed as private-sector employees in the QP at some point between 1986 and 2009. Of
these, about 5% have some inconsistency in their data (i.e., a missing or outlier wage observation if
employed, or a problem linking records over time). Deletion of these observations leads to a sample
of 86,909 men born in 1967 and ever observed in the QP with valid data, summarized in column 1
of Table 2. Given the low schooling attainment of the men in this cohort, most were presumably
out of school by age 19. Nevertheless only about one-fth were working full time at age 20 or 21
and meet the criteria to be potentially used in our analysis.17
Column 2 shows the characteristics of the entire sample of "early entrants" (i.e., those who
worked full time at age 20 or 21). Interestingly, the fraction of early entrants observed in the QP at
least once between 2002 and 2009 is very similar to the fraction of the entire cohort observed in that
interval (62% versus 61%), while the average wage of the early entrants is about 12% lower than the
average wage for the entire cohort (potentially reecting the lower schooling of the early entrants
than other men in the cohort). The fact that the mid-career outcomes of the early entrants are
relatively similar to those of the overall cohort is reassuring, and suggests that inferences about the
impacts of military service based on the early entrant group may be generalizable to the broader
population.
Among the early entrants we identify four subgroups: conscripts (column 4 of Table 2), who
were either working full time in March 1987 and on leave the next two years, or working full
time in March 1988 and on leave the next year; non-conscripts (column 5), who were working full
time in both March 1988 and March 1989; missing from the QP in 1989 (column 6) { men who
were unemployed, out of the labor force, or working in the government sector in March 1989; and
nally a fourth residual group (column 7) made up of men with a variety of employment histories
in the period from 1987 to 1989 that do not t into the other 3 groups. Both the missing and
residual groups presumably include both conscripts and non-conscripts. For example, men who
were working full time in March 1988 but who lost their job later in the year and were either
17A concern about the legal requirement that draftees be allowed to return to their job at the end of
their service is that this would discourage employers from hiring men before the age of 21. We conducted
a dierence in dierences analysis of employment rates of men and women at ages 18, 19, and 20 between
cohorts born in 1967 and those born in 1987, testing whether the employment rates of the 1967 cohort of
men were unusually low. This shows a small male  1967 interaction eect (around -1.5 percentage points)
potentially indicating a small discouragement eect in the hiring of men when the draft was in eect.
8serving in the military or unemployed a year later are in the missing group.
Comparisons across columns 4-7 show that the 1986-88 wages of the conscripted and non-
conscripted groups are quite similar, while the wages of the group who are missing from the 1989
QP are a little lower, and those of the residual group are a little higher. The conscripts have the
highest education levels of the four groups of early entrants, measured either in the rst year they
ever appear in the QP, or in 2002. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the military generally preferred
men with higher literacy and numeracy skills, leading to a systematic under-representation of the
lowest educated men in the conscripted group. Nevertheless, conscripts and non-conscripts have
nearly the same probability of appearing in the QP in the period from 2002 to 2009 (when they
were between 35 and 42 years of age), and fairly similar hourly wages. Interestingly, the group
who were missing from the QP in 1989 have a much lower likelihood of appearing in the data
set during 2002-2009, suggesting strong persistence in their low rate of private-sector employment.
The residual group, by comparison, has about the same likelihood of appearing in the QP in the
2002-2009 period as the conscripts and non-conscripts.
Finally, column 8 of Table 2 shows data for men born in 1967 who were not working full time in
either 1987 or 1988. Some of these men were attending post-secondary schooling. Consistent with
this fact, the fraction of non-early entrants with a university degree is relatively high (8%)18, and
on average they have two more years of education than the early entrants. Despite their relatively
late entry to the labor market, by mid-career they are about as likely to appear in the QP as the
early entrants group (61% with a wage observation between 2002 and 2009, versus 62% for early
entrants as a whole). By mid-career they also have about 17% higher average wages than the early
entrants (mean log wage = 1.71 versus 1.54 for early entrants), presumably reecting their higher
education.
In the remainder of the paper we mainly focus on comparisons between early entrants who can
be clearly identied as conscripts (column 4 of Table 2) and those who can be clearly identied as
non-conscripts (column 5). In Section 5, however, we also present a number of robustness checks
in which we consider relaxing the criteria to be included in the conscript and non-conscript groups,
thereby moving some of the men from the missing and residual categories into these groups. As we
show, plausible changes in the denitions of the two groups have little impact on our main results.
18A larger share attended college, given that the drop-out rate is approximately 30%.
94 Measuring the Causal Eect of Conscription on Subsequent
Earnings
In this section we lay out the econometric framework that we use to measure the causal eect of
conscription on subsequent earnings. As has been emphasized in the literature (e.g., Angrist, 1990)
a key problem in evaluating the impact of veteran service is the non-random selection of conscripts.
We address this problem by focusing on the eect of conscription on men who had already entered
full time work before they were at risk of conscription. For these men, the wage prior to entering
service can be used to control for unobserved ability dierences that would otherwise confound
observational comparisons between conscripts and non-conscripts, as in a standard \dierence-in-
dierences" analysis.
To proceed more formally, let S denote the level of schooling of a given man as of the date just
before the conscription decision is made. We assume that schooling at that point is a function of
a general measure of ability a and a random error component u1
S = f(a) + u1;
where f() is an unknown function. Let w0 represent the logarithm of the hourly wage that is
earned by the individual just prior to the determination of conscription status. We assume that
this wage depends on ability, schooling, and an additive error component v0 that is uncorrelated
with schooling and enlistment status:
w0 = a + 0S + v0:
Note that we are scaling ability by assuming that expected log wages in period 0 vary 1 for 1 with
a, holding constant schooling. Assume that the probability of enlistment (indicated by the binary
variable E) depends on an index of ability and schooling:
pr(E = 1) = F[g(a;S)]:
where F[] is some distribution function (e.g., a normal or logistic), and g() is an unknown function.
In general this specication implies that veterans and non-veterans with the same education will
have dierent average ability. For example, suppose that g(a;S) = 1a + 2S; where 1 and 2 are
both positive, i.e., the military prefers candidates with higher ability and higher schooling. Under
this assumption, conscripts with low schooling will only be accepted if they have above-average
10ability. Finally, we assume the wage in post-enlistment period t > 0 depends on an additive
function of ability, schooling, enlistment status, and an error component vt:
wt =  ta + tS + tE + vt; (1)
where  t is a loading factor that can vary over time and t is the eect of military service on wages
in period t. We assume that vt is uncorrelated with ability, schooling, and veteran status.
In general a simple regression of wages in period t on schooling and enlistment status will yield
an estimate of t that has probability limit:
plim b OLS
t = t +  tRa;EjS;
where Ra;EjS represents the (population) regression coecient of enlistment status from an auxiliary
regression of ability on enlistment status and schooling. If the probability of conscription is higher
for more able men, conditional on schooling, then Ra;EjS > 0, causing OLS to overstate the returns
to enlistment.
Assuming that w0 and wt both depend additively on ability we can use the quasi-dierencing
approach suggested by Chamberlain (1982) to obtain an equation that does not depend on ability:19
wt    tw0 = (t   0 t)S + tE + vt    tv0: (2)
Note that  t = 1 corresponds to the case in which ability dierences have the same impact on
wages at all ages. While this assumption may be appropriate for older workers, there is considerable
evidence in the "employer learning" literature (e.g., Farber and Gibbons,1996; Altonji and Pierret,
2001) that ability-driven wage dierentials widen in the rst few years in the labor market, as labor
market participants learn about the true abilities of dierent individuals.20 Schoenberg (2007, Table
5), for example shows that the eect of measured AFQT scores on wages of men in the NLSY rises
by a factor of 2 within the rst decade of labor market entry.21 This suggests a value of  t  2
when w0 is measured at a relatively young age (e.g., 20 or 21 in our case) and wt is measured in
mid-career.
19A similar technique is used by Lemieux (1998) to estimate the eect of unions on wages using data on
union status changers.
20The same point has arisen in studies that attempt to use income measured at a certain point as a proxy
for permanent income { see Haider and Solon (2006).
21Similar analyses have also been conducted using the same data set by Lange (2007), and Arcidiacono et
al. (2008). All these studies show a rise in the return to AFQT in the rst 10 years in the labor market,
particularly for men without a college education.
11To obtain estimates of  t that are appropriate for our context, we look rst at the correlation
structure of wages for non-conscripts in the 1967 birth cohort. We assume that their wages are
generated by equation (1) with E = 0 and an unrestricted year eect that captures cumulative
experience, real wage growth, and other factors.22 In addition, we assume that after  years in the
labor market,  t is constant (i.e.,  t =   for all t  ): We regress wages in all other years on
the wage in year  and obtain a set of coecients that allow us to identify the relative variances
of a and v; the correlation structure of the transitory earnings component vt; and the  0
ts (up to
a normalization that  0 = 1):
Specically, assuming that
w =  a + S + v;




w + (t   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= dtw + gtS + et: (3)
Using the "omitted variables" formula, the probability limit of the OLS estimate of dt in equation
(3) is:























For simplicity we assume that vt = vt 1 + t; with var[t] (i.e., the transitory wage component vt




and we can rewrite the expression for plim of b dt as:
plim b dt =
 t
 





represents the share of the variance in wages at age  that is attributable to the transitory compo-
nent v versus the permanent ability component a.
22We also assume that wages in any year a person is not observed in the QP are missing at random.
12To estimate  and  we use data from the period after age , when  t =  . In these years
equation (4) implies:
b dt = (1   ) + jt j + t; (5)
where t represents the sampling error in b dt : We obtain estimates and standard errors for  and 
using standard minimum distance techniques applied to the set of estimated regression coecients






b dt   b b jt j
1   b 
: (6)
Applying this equation to the wage observed just prior to potential enlistment at age 21 (i.e, t = 0;
which we assume has  0 = 1) we can obtain an estimate of the relative factor loading for year  :
  =
1   b 
b d0   b b  :
To implement this procedure we assume that the eect of ability on wages stabilizes after 12
years in the labor market (i.e., at age 33 for men who were working at age 20/21). We use the
observed wage at age 33 for our non-enlistees as the values of w, and regress wages in all other
years on this wage and dummies for schooling categories (measured at age 21). The set of regression
coecients b dt; for t=(21, 22, ... 42) are plotted in Figure 2. We also show the predicted values for
b dt using estimated values for  and  that provide the best t to the observed data for the years
after age 33, assuming
 t
  = 1. These are b  = 0:67 (standard error = 0:05) and b  = 0:25 (standard
error = 0:02). Note that the predicted values t the observed data for ages 35-42 relatively well,
suggesting that our simple model provides a reasonable description of the covariance structure of
the non-conscripts' wages.23 For earlier ages the tted values assuming
 t
  = 1 are substantially
larger than the observed values, suggesting that  t <   for t < :
Normalizing  0 = 1; the implied values of  t for each age from 21 to 42 are shown in Figure
3. Consistent with the patterns observed in the employer learning literature, the values rise sub-
stantially over the rst 10-12 years in the labor market. In particular, the estimate of   for wages
at ages 35-42 is 4:16 (with a boot-strapped standard error of 0:30) { substantially larger than the
estimate obtained by Schoenberg (2007) in the US context.
As a check on these calculations we re-did the same analysis using the wage data for conscripts.
We obtained very similar estimates of  and  (b  = 0:73 with standard error of 0.04, and b  = 0:20
23The R-squared is 0.56 for the 8 moments. The goodness of t statistic is 35.0, which is well above any
conventional critical value for a chi-square distribution with 6 degrees of freedom.
13with standard error of 0.09). Interestingly, the t of the model to the estimates of b dt for ages 35-42
is even better for conscripts, and passes a formal goodness-of-t test.24 Using these parameter
values and the estimate of b d0 = 0:22 for conscripts, the implied value for   for wages at ages 35-42
is 3:69 (with a bootstrapped standard error of 0:55).
Given the estimated parameters for either group we believe a reasonable point estimate for  
is 4, and a plausible upper bound is a value of 5. The similarity of the estimates of   based on the
covariance structure of wages for conscripts and non-conscripts is reassuring because it suggests that
the same transformation of the pre-conscription wage can control for ability in both groups. It also
implies that if the mean pre-conscription wages of the two groups are the same, wage comparisons
at mid-career are unconfounded by unobserved ability dierences.
5 The Eect of Conscription on Subsequent Wages
Graphical Overview
Figure 4a plots the mean log wages of conscripts and non-conscripts in the 1967 birth cohort who
are observed as wage-earners in the QP at each age from 18 (i.e., in 1986) to 42 (i.e., in 2009). Note
that because of missing data in the QP in 1990 and 2001 there are "holes" in the series at ages 23
and 34. Moreover, because we dene conscripts based on leave status at age 22 there are no wage
observations for them at that age.25 Since the duration of military service in the late 1980s was
at most two years, we interpret age 24 (i.e., data for 1991) as representing the rst year of post-
conscription outcomes. Examination of the wage series in Figure 4a shows that pre-conscription
wages (i.e., at ages 18-21) are very similar for the two groups, as is the rst post-conscription wage
at age 24. Thereafter the wages of conscripts are typically a little higher (+1-2%). Figures 4b and
4c present similar data for less-educated men (under 6 years of completed schooling at age 20 or
21) and more-educated men (6 or more years of completed schooling). The wage advantage for
conscripts after age 30 appears to be larger and more systematic for the less-educated group, while
for the more-educated group the wage gap appears to be centered on zero.
A potential issue with later-life wage comparisons between conscripts and non-conscripts is that
the two groups may have dierent employment rates (or dierent private sector employment rates,
since the QP is limited to private sector workers). Figure 5a shows the fractions of each group who
24The test statistic is 10.63, which has a p-value of 0.10.
25Recall that by construction every conscript has a wage observation at age 20 or 21. In fact 76% have a
wage at 20 and 82% have a wage at 21. In contrast, all non-conscripts have to have a wage at age 21 and 22.
14are captured in the QP at each age from 24 to 42. In their 20's the conscripts have slightly lower
employment rates than the non-conscripts (e.g., a gap of -3.6 percentage points at age 24, in 1991,
and a gap of -1.9% at age 30, in 1997). After age 35, however, the gaps are uniformly small. For
the less-educated group (Figure 5b) the employment gaps vary more by age, but are never larger
than 3% in absolute value. For the more-educated group (Figure 5c) the gaps are a little larger and
more systematic between the ages of 24 and 30, but are very small after age 35. These patterns
suggest that wage comparisons between conscripts and non-conscripts under the age of 30 have to
be interpreted cautiously, since the conscript group has a somewhat lower employment rate in this
age range, potentially inducing a selectivity bias. After age 35, however, there is less concern about
selectivity.
In the Appendix we present an extended series of graphical comparisons that supplement the
ndings in Figures 4 and 5. First, we show the age proles of wages and employment for women
born in 1967 who meet the same criteria as our conscript and non-conscript groups. The female
"conscripts" are presumably women who took maternity leave at ages 21 and/or 22, while the "non-
conscripts" are women who worked continuously at those ages. Consistent with other evidence on
the costs of child-bearing (e.g., Light and Ureta, 1995), we nd that women who took leave tend to
have lower wages later in their careers than those who did not. The gap is particularly pronounced
for higher-educated women, as might be expected if career interruptions have a higher cost for
them. Employment rates of women who took leave in their early 20's are also lower than the rates
for those who did not. The negative impacts of leave-taking for young women contrasts with the
generally positive wage eects (and 0 employment eects) for men, and conrms that there is not
a simple mechanical explanation for the male eects.
We also present graphs showing the wage and employment outcomes for all four groups of early
labor market entrants dened in Table 2 (i.e., conscripts, non-conscripts, men who were missing
from the QP at age 22, and the residual group of early entrants). Generally, the wages of all four
groups are fairly similar, though the residual group tends to have slightly lower wages than the other
three. The employment rates of the groups vary more - in particular, as noted in the discussion of
Table 2, the group who were not in the QP in 1989 have substantially lower employment rates at all
ages than those who were recorded as unpaid leave in that year. This reinforces our classication
scheme, which treats being "on leave" (included in the QP with missing hours and wages) as
dierent from being absent altogether from the survey.
15Regression Models
Table 3a presents the estimated wage premiums for conscripts at dierent ages from four dierent
sets of models. The estimates in column 1 (and associated standard errors in column 2) are from
specications that control only for education prior to the age of conscription (using a set of dummies
for each possible value recorded in the QP). These very simple specications would be appropriate if
enlistment status were as good as randomly assigned, conditional on education. The models in the
remaining columns of the table use the pre-conscription wage to control for potential dierences in
ability between conscripts and non-conscripts. In the models summarized in columns 3-4, the pre-
conscription wage is simply entered as an additional control variable. In the models in columns 5-6,
the wage in each year is dierenced from the pre-conscription wage, imposing the assumption that
the coecient  t in equation (2) is 1. Finally, in the models in columns 7-8, we use the estimated
quasi-dierencing factor of 4:16 implied by our analysis of the wage process of non-enlistees.
A potentially surprising feature of the estimates in Table 3a is that the estimated enlistment
eect in any particular year is not very dierent across the four specications. This is also true
of the pooled estimates in the bottom two rows of the table. Focusing on the pooled estimates
for mid-career (ages 35-42) the estimated wage impact of enlistment is 2:1% with no control for
pre-enlistment wages, 2:1% when the pre-enlistment wage is entered freely in the regression model
(the estimated coecient in this case is 0:36), 2:0% when wages in all periods are dierenced from
the pre-enlistment wage, and 1:9% when we quasi-dierence using a factor of 4.16. The remarkable
stability of the estimates across dierent values of the dierencing factor is illustrated in Figure 6a,
where we plot the estimated enlistment eect for ages 35-42 against various values for the quasi-
dierencing factor, ranging from 0 to 5, as well as the pointwise 95% condence intervals. Though
the estimates from higher values of the quasi-dierencing factor are relatively imprecise, the point
estimates are essentially invariant to the value of the quasi-dierencing factor. The explanation
for this stability is that mean pre-enlistment wages are virtually identical for conscripts and non-
conscripts. Thus, adjusting the wage in any later period by subtracting o  tw0 has no eect on
the point estimate of t from equation (2), though dierent choices for  t do aect the sampling
error of the estimates.
Importantly, the orthogonality of pre-enlistment wages and enlistment status does not arise
because pre-enlistment wages are "pure noise". In fact, pre-enlistment wages are highly predictive
of later wage outcomes, suggesting that they contain signicant information about individual ability.
16For example, the correlation of the pre-conscription wage with wages in 2000 (at age 33) is 0.36.26
Even as late as 2009, when the men in our sample were age 42, the correlation of wages with
pre-conscription wages is 0.30, and dierences in pre-conscription wages can explain nearly 10% of
overall wage variation.
Tables 3b and 3c report a parallel series of models estimated for the subsets of men with lower
or higher levels of education just prior to enlistment. As in the overall sample, the estimated
enlistment eects at each age for these two groups are quite similar across specications. For less
educated men, there is a slight negative wage eect at age 24: thereafter the eects tend to rise
with age, reaching around 5% by age 40. Pooling ages 35-42, the estimated eect of conscription
for men with 5 or less years of schooling at age 20 is around +4%, and is statistically signicant at
conventional levels for models with  t  1. For the more educated subgroup (with 6 or more years
of completed schooling by age 20) the wage eects of conscription are never large or signicant,
and the pooled estimates for ages 35-42 are very close to 0. The patterns of the pooled mid-career
estimates for dierent values of the quasi-dierencing factor are summarized in Figures 6b and
6c. As in the overall sample, the estimated wage eects are quite robust, reecting the fact that
enlistment status is uncorrelated with pre-enlistment wages, despite the relatively high correlations
of pre-enlistment wages with subsequent wage outcomes.
Assuming that pre-conscription wages are orthogonal to enlistment status, the decision of which
particular value of  t to use in the estimation of post-conscription treatment eects can be based on
eciency considerations. Under orthogonality between ability and enlistment status, a simple OLS
regression on schooling, initial wages, and enlistment status provides the least-variance estimates.
We therefore focus on this specication { i.e., the estimates presented in column 3 of Tables 3a-3c
{ as the basis for our "preferred" estimates.
Robustness Checks
Our analysis so far has focused on comparisons between two subgroups of men who we can easily
classify as either conscripts or non-conscripts. In this section we consider the robustness of our
conclusions to changes in the way that we dene these two groups. The results are summarized in
Table 4, where we show estimates of the pooled enlistment eect for ages 35-42 from specications
with dierent quasi-dierencing factors, using alternative denitions of the conscripted and non-
26The correlations are not signicantly dierent for non-conscripts (=0.36; n=2,648) and conscripts
(=0.38; n=1,008).
17conscripted groups. We show results for all education groups in panel a, results for men with
low-education at ages 20-21 in panel b, and results for men with higher education in panel c.
Focusing rst on panel a, the rst row shows the results from our "baseline" sample denition
(these are taken from the last row of Table 3a). In row 2 we relax our denition of "early entrants"
{ which is based on full time work at age 20 or 21 in our baseline samples { to include part time
workers.27 This expands the conscript sample by about 10% and the non-conscript sample by about
17%. Nevertheless, the estimated enlistment eects from the various specications are all nearly
identical to the baseline estimates.
Our basic conscript denition includes two groups of men: those who were working full time
in March 1987 and on leave in the next two years; and those who were working full time in March
1988 and on leave in the next year. Arguably, the requirement that the rst group be on leave in
both 1988 and 1989 may be too strict, since some men may have been inducted in the early months
of 1988 and served only a year in the military. In row 3 we expand the denition of conscripts to
include men who were working full time in March 1987, on leave the next year, and observed in
any status in March 1989. This increases the conscript group by about 40%, and has little impact
on the estimates with no control for the pre-conscription wage (columns 1-2) or with the pre-
conscription wage included as a regressor (columns 3-4). However, in the dierenced specication
(columns 5-6) the alternative sample yields a somewhat larger estimate than the baseline sample
(3.8% versus 2.0%), and in the quasi-dierenced specication with   = 4:16, it yields a very large
positive estimate (9.1%). This is attributable to the fact that the pre-conscription wages of the
added conscripts (i.e., those who were working full time in March 1987, on leave in March 1988,
and not on leave in March 1989) are slightly lower than those of other groups, and when 4:16w0
is subtracted from wages observed at later ages they appear to have a signicant wage advantage.
We believe the initial wage gap between the "added" conscripts and other groups of conscripts and
non-conscripts is problematic, and therefore place little weight on the large point estimate arising
from the quasi-dierenced model when this group is included.
In row 4 we consider narrowing the conscript group from our baseline by imposing the extra
requirement that men who were working full time in March 1988 and on leave in March 1989 also
were working full time in March 1987. This reduces the size of the conscript group by about 25%
27Thus, non-conscripts are dened as men who were observed working (with a valid wage) in 1988 and
1989, and conscripts are dened as men who either were working in March 1987 and on leave in March 1988
and 1989, or working in March 1988 and on leave in March 1989.
18and leads to estimates that are slightly larger in the specications in columns 1-4 and slightly
smaller in the specications in columns 5-8. In all cases, however, the alternative estimates are
within 1 standard error of the baseline estimates.
Finally, in row 5 we address a potential non-comparability between the way we measure pre-
conscription wages for conscripts and non-conscripts. Recall that non-conscripts had to be observed
working at ages 21 and 22 (i.e., in 1988 and 1989), and we use their wage at age 21 as their "pre-
conscription wage". Just over 80% of our conscript group are men who were observed working at
age 21 and on leave at age 22: for these men we also use the wage at 21 as the pre-conscription wage.
But for the other 20%, who were working at age 20 and on leave at ages 21 and 22, we use their
wage at 20 as the pre-conscription wage. This may lead to some understatement of pre-conscription
wage for the enlistees. As a check, we inated the age-20 wage for the relevant subgroup by the
rate of growth of wages for all men who were observed working at ages 20 and 21 (+7.15%).
This probably overstates the wage growth the "early inductees" would have experienced if they
had not been drafted, so we regard this adjustment as providing an upper bound on the impact
of the measurement timing issue. Applying the adjustment opens up a gap in pre-enlistment
wages between the conscripts and non-conscripts: the mean wage gap rises from 0.2% with the
unadjusted data to 1.5% with the adjusted data. As a result, the enlistment eect from the
dierenced specication falls by about 1.5%, while the enlistment eect for the quasi-dierenced
specication falls by about 6% (4.16 times the initial gap).
Panels b and c present parallel sets of estimates for low-education and high-education men. In
both cases the departures from the baseline sample lead to changes in the estimated enlistment
eects that are similar to what we see in the overall sample. In particular, relaxing the full
time work requirement has almost no eect on the point estimates, while the narrowed denition
of conscripts in row 4 of each panel leads to estimates that are within a standard error of the
corresponding baseline estimates. The only signicant departure from the baseline estimates arises
when using the expanded denition of conscripts in row 3 and the quasi-dierenced model. For
the low-educated subsample the change in sample shifts the point estimate from 4.8% to 13.6%
- a large change that is entirely attributable to a gap between the pre-conscription wages of the
added conscripts and those of the other conscripts and non-conscripts that is magnied in the
quasi-dierenced specication.
Overall we interpret the robustness checks as providing general support for the conclusions
19derived from our baseline sample. A caveat is that our use of pre-enlistment wages to control for
unobserved ability dierences between conscripts and non-conscripts is relatively sensitive to even
small dierences in the pre-enlistment wage gap. For our baseline sample the mean pre-enlistment
wages of conscripts and non-conscripts are almost identical, and the estimated impacts of enlistment
on mid-career wages are relatively robust. But changes to the samples that lead to even modest
gaps in pre-enlistment wages can result in relatively large changes in the estimated mid-career
eects, reecting the fact that ability dierences that are observed at a young age tend to widen
substantially with experience.
Mechanisms
The estimates in Tables 3b and 3c show a signicant but modestly-sized eect of conscription on
the mid-career wages of low-educated men, coupled with a zero eect on higher-educated men.
In this section we investigate some of the possible channels for the conscription eect, including
education, occupation, industry, and location.
We begin in Table 5 by looking at the relationship between enlistment status and post-enlistment
changes in education. Specically, we construct an estimate of the change in education between age
20/21 and age 42 for each person in our baseline sample who was observed working at least once in
the 2002-2009 period, and run two simple models: one including only a constant and an enlistment
dummy, the second adding a set of dummies for alternative values of initial education.28 On average
the early entrants who are observed in mid-career in the QP gained 0.77 years of education over
their twenties and thirties. As shown in column (1) of Table 5 the average gain is only slightly
larger for the conscripts (+0.07 years, standard error = 0.05). As might be expected, however,
the gains dier for men with diering levels of initial education, and since the conscripted group
under-represents both very low educated men, and those with the most education, it is important to
control for initial education in measuring the eect of conscription. Adding these controls (column
2) leads to small but signicantly positive enlistment eect (+0.14 years, t=2.64).
The remaining columns of Table 5 show parallel models for the subgroups with less than 6 years
of initial schooling and 6 or more years of initial education. In the low-education subgroup enlistees
gain about 1
4 of a year more schooling than non-enlistees, while in the high-education subgroup
28We assign education in 2009 based on the latest year that the individual is observed in the QP. Among
men observed at least once in 2002-2009, 75% are last observed in 2009 and 90% are observed in 2006 or
later.
20there is no eect of enlistment. Assuming a return to education of about 8% in the Portuguese
market in the 2000's this extra schooling would yield a 2 percentage point higher average wage
for low-education enlistees: enough to "explain" about half of the wage advantage we estimate in
Tables 3 and 4 for these men.
We conducted a similar analysis of cumulative labor market experience. As might be expected
given the very similar probabilities of employment of conscripts and non-conscripts documented
in Figures 5a-5c, however, cumulative experience of the two groups increases at the same rate
over our sample period, in particular for men with only primary schooling measured at age 20/21.
Thus, experience eects appear to play no role in the wage gap for conscripts with low schooling
at induction.
To explore the contributions of education and other possible channels more formally, we t a
series of models for wages in the 2002-2009 period in which we sequentially add controls for variables
(like post-enlistment schooling) that could have been aected by enlistment. By comparing the
estimated enlistment eects with and without these controls we can determine the share of the
basic enlistment eect that is "explained" by each possible channel.
Row 1 of Table 6 shows the estimated enlistment coecients for the overall sample, while rows
2 and 3 present the coecients for the low-education and higher-education subsets. The estimates
in the rst column of the table simply reproduce the estimates from the last row in columns 3-4
of Tables 3a-3c, respectively. (Recall that these models include the pre-enlistment wage, dummies
for initial education, and year eects). In column 2 we present models that add dummies for
current education. As expected from the ndings in Table 5, this addition has little impact on the
estimated enlistment coecient for higher-education men, but leads to a noticeable reduction in
the coecient for lower-educated men. In column 3 we augment the baseline model with controls
for 2-digit occupation (22 dummies). These have an even larger eect on the enlistment coecient
for low-education men, but again not much impact for higher-educated men. Industry controls
(column 4) have about the same eect as current education, while controls for major cities (Lisbon
and Porto) and rm size actually lead to slightly larger enlistment coecients for the less-educated
subgroup.29 Finally, in column 7 we present models that include all the available controls. Taken
together these explain about 1 percentage point of the total enlistment eect for the pooled sample
29The eects of log rm size and a Lisbon location are both highly signicant (t-ratios over 10 in each
case).
21and for low-educated men.
We interpret the estimates in Tables 5 and 6 as suggesting that some, but not all, of the positive
enlistment eect we nd for the mid-career wages of lower-educated men is attributable to enlistees
obtaining additional schooling and/or training relative to non-enlistees in the years during and
after their military service. This added education allowed access to better-paying occupations and
industries and increased wages by 1-2 percent. A similar-sized or even larger component appears
to arise from higher wages "within" education, occupation, and industry categories.
6 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we use detailed administrative data covering the entire private sector of the Portuguese
economy to study the long-term eects of peace-time military service on the cohort of men born
in 1967. These men were drafted at age 21 and spent up to two years in the armed forces. Given
the very low levels of educational attainment in Portugal, many men were working full time in the
years prior to the determination of their induction status. We take advantage of this feature and
use pre-enlistment wages to control for potential unobserved ability dierences between conscripts
and non-conscripts. There is substantial evidence from existing research, and from the covariance
structure of wages in our data, that ability dierences observed at age 20 tend to be magnied
later in the career. We t a simple dynamic factor for wages that provides an estimate of the
changing return to ability between early and mid-career that we can use to rescale dierentials
in the pre-conscription wage. Estimates from this model imply that the same transformation of
initial wages can be used to control for ability dierences in mid-career wages. Fortunately, in
our main analysis sample enlistment status is orthogonal to pre-enlistment wages, conditional on
pre-enlistment schooling. As a result, our estimates of the long-run wage impacts of conscription
are robust to alternative procedures for eliminating the impact of unobserved ability dierences.
We nd a small positive, but statistically insignicant impact of military service on wages at
mid-career (ages 35-42). This is similar to recent ndings on the eects of peace-time conscription in
Britain (Grenet et al., 2011) and West Germany (Bauer et al., 2009), and also to recent estimates of
the eect of military service on Vietnam era draftees at age 40 (Angrist, Chen and Song, 2011). The
small average eect, however, is comprised of a larger positive eect for men with only a primary
education (about one-half of the early labor market entrants in the cohort) and a zero eect for
better-educated men. The positive impact on the low-educated subgroup is partially explained by
22the fact that enlistees with initially low education acquire more education than non-enlistees. They
also work in somewhat better-paying industries and occupations. We conjecture that the higher
schooling and occupational outcomes may be attributed in part to basic skills and occupational
training received in the military, though we have no direct data on the extent of this training.
Several features of the institutional setting may have contributed to the positive impact of
service for less-educated men in our sample. First, these men had at most 4 years of schooling
when they entered the military. A year of basic skills training could have a potentially important
impact on such men { allowing some to achieve literacy, for example. Second, Portuguese law
required rms to rehire draftees at the completion of their service. This may have eased the
transition back to civilian life for the conscripts in our analysis, who all held full time jobs just
before entering the military. Third, it is important to emphasize that the military service we study
occurred during peacetime. Nevertheless, our ndings conrm a longstanding belief among many
analysts that coerced military service can have a positive wage impact for initially disadvantaged
men, perhaps comparable in magnitude to the impact of other labor market training programs.
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Quadros de Pessoal (QP) data are gathered annually by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment.
All rms with wage-earners are required to complete the survey. Civil servants and household
workers are excluded from coverage. The coverage of agriculture is also relatively low, given its low
share of wage-earners. The mandatory nature of the survey leads to extremely high response rates,
and in recent years nearly all rms with wage-earners in manufacturing and services are included
in the data set. Nevertheless, there was some under-coverage {particularly of very small rms{ in
the initial years of the QP (Portugal, MTSS, 1990).
All personnel working in the rm in a reference week (in March until 1993 and in October from
1994 onwards) are in-scope for the QP. Workers on short-term leave (e.g., sickness, maternity leave,
vacation, and strikes) and those on leave for compulsory military service are also supposed to be
reported. Appendix Table A.1 claries the coding of leaves of absence during the period under
analysis.
Reported data in the QP include the rm's location, industry, employment, sales, ownership
(private Portuguese-owned, private foreign-owned, or public-owned), incorporation status, and the
worker's gender, age, occupation, schooling, date of hire, monthly earnings (split into several com-
ponents), and hours of work. Schooling information pertains to the highest completed level of
education, with the following categories: rst cycle or primary education (4 years); second cycle (6
years); third cycle (9 years); high school (12 years); university.1
Workers are assigned an identication number, based on a transformation of the social security
number, that enables tracking over time. Similarly, each rm entering the database is assigned a
unique identication number and it can be followed over time. The Ministry implements several
checks to ensure that a rm that has already reported to the database is not assigned a dierent
identication number. Most of these routines are based on the detailed location of the company
and its legal identication codes.
Merging data across years
We combine QP data for the period from 1986 to 2009. The following data checks and selection
procedures were implemented to prepare a worker-level data set to be merged across years.
1Since the mid-1990s, these categories, and in particular the two highest categories, are further subdivided.Selection of valid worker identication codes: Observations with missing or invalid worker iden-
tication codes have been dropped. This restriction led to dropping an average 5.5% percent of the
observations in the original yearly data sets made available by the Ministry of Employment.
Handling of duplicate worker identication codes in a given year: Only workers whose identi-
cation number appears at a maximum of two dierent rms are included in the annual le we use to
build a longitudinal le. This allows workers to have a maximum of two jobs during the reference
week. In the case of a duplicate observation in any year, we also checked that the worker's gender,
date of birth, and schooling were the same in both jobs { otherwise the observations were dropped.
On average 0.6 percent of the original observations in the annual QP les are dropped because
the worker appeared at 3 or more rms; 2.7 percent of the observations were dropped because the
worker appeared at two rms but had dierent gender, age or schooling in the two jobs; and 0.1
percent of the observations were dropped because the worker was reported twice by the same rm.
After these data checks, on average 91 percent of the observations in the original yearly data sets
are retained, yielding an initial panel of 50,847,109 person-year observations on 7,963,035 workers.
Checks on the consistency of the longitudinal data
We imputed age and/or schooling to missing observations whenever there was no obvious incon-
sistency in the reported values.2 These imputations aected 1.2 percent and 0.9 percent of the
observations in the initial panel, respectively for age and schooling.
Inconsistencies were identied if the worker's gender or date of birth was reported as changing,
or if the highest schooling level was reported as decreasing over time. In such cases, the value
reported in over 50% of the non-missing records was treated as the correct value (if there was such
a value). Using this procedure, 0.8 percent, 2.5 percent and 7.7 percent of the observations in
the initial panel were corrected for inconsistencies in reported gender, birth date and education,
respectively. In cases where no value was reported more than half the time, the individual was
dropped from the panel. Overall, 1.5 percent, 0.8 percent and 6.2 percent of the observations are
dropped due to inconsistent information on gender, birth date or schooling, respectively.
Finally, any remaining workers with missing age or schooling were dropped (0.3 percent and 1.7
percent of the initial panel, respectively).
2If schooling was consistently reported (possibly increasing over time) and the values it achieved before and after
a missing year were the same, the missing value was corrected; similarly, missings in the initial/nal period(s) were
extrapolated from the earliest/latest reported value.The nal panel data set includes 45,511,769 person-year observations for 7,159,178 workers: this
represents approximately 90 percent of the initial panel.
A nal set of checks on the longitudinal data concentrated on the date of hire information.
Dates of hire later than the date of the survey reference week were considered as mistakes and
recoded to missing (aecting 3.8% of the observations). Missing information on date of hire was
imputed whenever it was consistently reported for other years in the spell (aecting 4.6% of the
observations). When the information was reported inconsistently across years, the date of hire
reported more than one-half the time was taken as the correct one, leading to corrections for 2.1%
of the observations. If after these corrections a worker had two or more dates of hire within the
same employment spell the rst reported date was considered the correct date (correcting 0.9% of
the observations). Workers with inconsistent data after the introduction of the previous corrections
were assigned missing information on date of hire (0.1% of the observations).Table A.1: Types of leave and their coding during the period under analysis
Type of Worker QP Coding of Coding of Notes











=1 Wage paid (approx. 65% of normal wage)
by the social security, after 3 days of sick-
ness. Estimated overall rate of sickness
absenteeism in Portugal: 8% (EFILWC,
1997, p. 18).
Maternity yes missing missing =1 Maternity leave started in Portugal in1976,
when it lasted for 90 days. Currently, it
lasts for 120 days.
Strike yes missing missing =1 Average of 0.016% work days lost per
year during 1986-1996 (own computations
based on Portugal, INE (2011) and Por-
data (2011)).
Holiday yes reported reported =0
Military yes missing missing =1
Note: (1) Instructions to ll out the questionnaire during the 1980s and 1990s stated that everyone engaged in the rm during the reference period should
be listed, including: "the owner of the rm, if performing a function in the rm; unpaid and paid family members, if working in the rm more than one
third of the normal duration of work; piece-rate workers; workers on short-term leave and those doing their military service" (Portugal, MT, Decree-Law
380/80, instructions on lling out column 2 of the Quadros de Pessoal form) [own translation]. Elsewhere in the instructions form, examples of short term
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age
conscripted not conscripted
c. cohort 1967, females, higher school.
Note: 'Conscripted' is an individual working full-time in1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the years
military enlistment is due; 'non-conscripted' is an individual observed working full-time during the years
military enlistment would have been due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year
the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS
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age
conscripted not conscripted
c. cohort 1967, females higher sch.
Note: 'Conscripted' is an individual working full-time the year before military enlistment is due, and reported
on leave during the years military enlistment is due; 'non-conscripted' is an individual observed working
full-time during the years military enlistment would have been due. For the cohort born 1967, military
enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months. Source: Computations

















































































































































c. early entrants, higher school.
Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time in1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the years
military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full-time during the years
military enlistment would have been due; 'missing' is an individual not observed employed in the private
sector during the years military conscription was due; the 'residual' category combines all other combinations
of labor market situations from 1987 to 1989. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the
year the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS
















































































c. early entrants, higher sch.
Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time the year before military enlistment is due, and reported
on leave during the years military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working
full-time during the years military enlistment would have been due; 'missing' is an individual not observed
employed in the private sector during the years military conscription was due; the 'residual' category combines
all other combinations of labor market situations from 1987 to 1989. For the cohort born 1967, military
enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Table 1: Share of Male Cohort Enlisted
Year of Fraction Year of Fraction
Birth Enlisted Birth Enlisted
1965 0.35 1973 0.24
1966 0.36 1974 0.46
1967 0.40 1975 0.49
1968 0.40 1976 0.39
1969 0.36 1977 0.33
1970 0.46 1978 0.35
1971 0.41 1979 0.36
1972 0.24
Note: Shares calculated as the ratio of conscripted males each year over the size of the cohort due to enlist
(an approximation, given the possibility to defer enlistment). The values for the 1972 and 1973 cohorts
represent total enlistments in 1993, divided by the total number of men in the 1972 and 1973 cohorts.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, EME (2000) and Pordata (2010).Table 2: Summary Statistics on Sub-Groups of Male Cohort Born 1967
Complete Early Entrants (Working Full-Time in 1987 or 1988) Not
Cohort Total Conscripted Missing Residual Early
Yes/No Yes No Entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of observations 86,909 18,517 6,749 1,838 4,911 9,502 2,266 68,392
Pre-enlistment:
Share with observed wage
1986 14.1 46.6 51.4 62.1 47.4 39.9 61.0 5.3
1987 16.5 72.3 66.4 77.5 62.3 71.5 93.2 1.4
1988 15.5 68.0 95.0 81.5 100.0 58.9 25.7 1.2
1989 13.2 36.7 72.8 0.0 100.0 0.0 82.9 6.8
Share on leave of absence
1986 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.4 0.4
1987 0.6 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.6 0.6 0.2 0.5
1988 2.1 6.0 5.0 18.5 0.0 3.3 19.8 1.1
1989 3.4 11.8 27.2 100.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 1.2
(Log) real hourly wage
1986 0.603 0.612 0.618 0.629 0.613 0.601 0.624 0.583
(0.291) (0.283) (0.285) (0.284) (0.286) (0.283) (0.275) (0.309)
1987 0.776 0.776 0.790 0.801 0.784 0.766 0.778 0.777
(0.252) (0.239) (0.237) (0.249) (0.231) (0.237) (0.251) (0.387)
1988 0.840 0.841 0.849 0.857 0.846 0.827 0.884 0.828
(0.268) (0.257) (0.248) (0.261) (0.244) (0.254) (0.35) (0.396)
1989 0.914 0.923 0.919 0.919 0.932 0.901
(0.299) (0.281) (0.261) (0.261) (0.327) (0.323)
Schooling:
Share <=4 years at entry 40.8 53.7 53.2 46.4 55.8 53.9 54.5 37.3
Av. at entry into labor market 6.854 5.315 5.336 5.502 5.274 5.331 5.184 7.271
(3.67) (2.122) (2.147) (1.984) (2.202) (2.15) (1.918) (3.884)
Av. in 2002 7.116 5.797 5.825 6.021 5.752 5.810 5.659 7.544
(3.659) (2.323) (2.331) (2.195) (2.376) (2.356) (2.15) (3.903)
Post-enlistment:
Share with wage observation(s), 2002-2009 60.9 62.2 72.6 72.4 72.7 52.4 72 60.6
(Log) real hourly wage, 2002-09 1.665 1.544 1.545 1.572 1.535 1.551 1.516 1.707
(0.593) (0.427) (0.433) (0.431) (0.433) (0.429) (0.340) (0.634)
Note: Early entrants are dened as men who were observed working full time in either 1987 or 1988. Conscripted men include men who were working
full time in 1987, and were on leave of absence (listed on the roster of employees with missing values for wages and hours) in 1988 and 1989, plus men
who were working full time in 1988 and on leave in 1989. Non-conscripted men are those who were working full time in 1988 and 1989. Missing group in
column 6 are those who were working full time in 1987 or 1988 and are not present in the QP in 1989. Residual group in column 7 are all men who were
working full time in 1987 or 1988 and are not included as conscripts, non-conscripts, or missing. Share with wage observation(s), 2002-2009 refers to the
fraction of the group indicated in the column heading who were observed as wage earners in the QP at least once between 2002 and 2009.Table 3a: Estimated Wage Effects of Conscription at Various Ages from Alternative Models (Pooled Edu-
cation Groups)
OLS Model with No OLS Model Including Dierenced Model: Quasi-Dierenced Model:
Control for Wage at Control for Wage at Wage Minus Wage at Wage Minus 4.16 x Wage at
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21
Age Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std.
Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error




24 -1.4 (1.1) -1.8 (1.0) -2.1 (1.1) -4.2 (3.2)
25 1.7 (1.2) 1.4 (1.1) 1.0 (1.2) -1.0 (3.4)
26 1.5 (1.3) 1.4 (1.2) 1.3 (1.3) 0.9 (3.5)
27 1.2 (1.4) 1.1 (1.3) 0.9 (1.4) 0.0 (3.7)
28 1.8 (1.3) 1.5 (1.2) 1.1 (1.3) -1.2 (3.6)
29 2.6 (1.4) 2.2 (1.4) 1.7 (1.5) -1.1 (3.7)
30 0.6 (1.3) 0.6 (1.3) 0.6 (1.4) 0.6 (3.6)
31 1.4 (1.3) 1.0 (1.2) 0.5 (1.4) -2.0 (3.6)
32 0.9 (1.3) 0.6 (1.2) 0.1 (1.3) -2.2 (3.6)
33 1.2 (1.3) 1.2 (1.3) 1.0 (1.4) 0.4 (3.5)
35 0.8 (1.4) 0.9 (1.4) 0.9 (1.5) 1.1 (3.6)
36 2.2 (1.4) 2.3 (1.4) 2.4 (1.5) 3.2 (3.8)
37 0.4 (1.4) 0.6 (1.4) 0.9 (1.5) 2.4 (3.8)
38 2.2 (1.4) 2.1 (1.4) 2.0 (1.5) 1.3 (3.6)
39 3.0 (1.5) 2.8 (1.4) 2.6 (1.5) 1.1 (3.7)
40 3.7 (1.5) 3.5 (1.4) 3.1 (1.5) 1.3 (3.6)
41 2.5 (1.4) 2.4 (1.4) 2.2 (1.5) 1.4 (3.7)
42 1.7 (1.5) 1.8 (1.5) 2.1 (1.6) 3.3 (3.7)
Pooled: 24-33 1.1 (0.9) 0.9 (0.8) 0.6 (0.9) -1.0 (3.2)
Pooled: 35-42 2.1 (1.2) 2.1 (1.2) 2.0 (1.3) 1.9 (3.5)
Notes: Estimated coecients times 100 (with standard errors in parentheses) from models t separately by age to wages of conscripts and non-conscripts.
All models include dummies for education as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use
as dependent variable wage at indicated age, minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus
4.16 times wage at age 20/21. Pooled estimates use sample of available person-year observations, and include year dummies. Standard errors for pooled
models are clustered by person. Source: Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Table 3b: Estimated Wage Effects of Conscription at Various Ages from Alternative Models for Low-
Education Men
OLS Model with No OLS Model Including Dierenced Model: Quasi-Dierenced Model:
Control for Wage at Control for Wage at Wage Minus Wage at Wage Minus 4.16 x Wage at
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21
Age Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std.
Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error




24 -1.4 (1.5) -1.7 (1.4) -1.9 (1.5) -3.6 (4.5)
25 -0.8 (1.5) -1.0 (1.5) -1.4 (1.6) -3.2 (4.6)
26 0.1 (1.8) 0.7 (1.7) 1.0 (1.8) 2.9 (4.7)
27 0.9 (1.9) 0.9 (1.8) 0.9 (1.9) 0.6 (5.0)
28 1.0 (1.7) 1.1 (1.6) 1.2 (1.8) 1.9 (4.9)
29 3.1 (2.0) 2.8 (1.9) 2.7 (2.1) 1.3 (5.2)
30 -0.7 (1.8) -0.6 (1.7) -0.5 (1.9) 0.1 (4.9)
31 0.5 (1.7) 0.7 (1.6) 1.2 (1.8) 3.6 (5.0)
32 2.0 (1.7) 2.1 (1.6) 2.3 (1.8) 3.3 (4.8)
33 1.7 (1.7) 1.9 (1.6) 2.1 (1.8) 3.0 (4.8)
35 2.9 (1.8) 3.1 (1.8) 3.4 (1.9) 4.8 (5.0)
36 4.2 (1.9) 4.6 (1.8) 5.5 (2.0) 9.4 (5.2)
37 2.3 (1.8) 2.6 (1.8) 3.3 (2.0) 6.7 (5.2)
38 3.6 (1.9) 3.6 (1.8) 3.6 (2.0) 3.4 (5.1)
39 4.1 (1.8) 3.9 (1.8) 3.4 (2.0) 1.3 (5.1)
40 5.0 (1.9) 4.9 (1.8) 4.8 (2.0) 4.0 (5.1)
41 5.5 (1.8) 5.4 (1.8) 5.2 (2.0) 4.2 (5.1)
42 4.8 (1.8) 4.8 (1.8) 4.9 (2.0) 5.1 (5.2)
Pooled: 24-33 0.6 (1.2) 0.6 (1.1) 0.7 (1.3) 0.9 (4.4)
Pooled: 35-42 4.1 (1.7) 4.1 (1.6) 4.3 (1.8) 4.8 (5.0)
Notes: Estimated coecients times 100 (with standard errors in parentheses) from models t separately by age to wages of conscripts and non-conscripts.
All models include dummies for education as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use
as dependent variable wage at indicated age, minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus
4.16 times wage at age 20/21. Pooled estimates use sample of available person-year observations, and include year dummies. Standard errors for pooled
models are clustered by person. Source: Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Table 3c: Estimated Wage Effects of Conscription at Various Ages from Alternative Models for High-
Education Men
OLS Model with No OLS Model Including Dierenced Model: Quasi-Dierenced Model:
Control for Wage at Control for Wage at Wage Minus Wage at Wage Minus 4.16 x Wage at
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21
Age Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std.
Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error




24 -1.4 (1.6) -1.8 (1.4) -2.2 (1.5) -4.7 (4.6)
25 3.7 (1.8) 3.4 (1.7) 3.0 (1.8) 0.7 (5.0)
26 2.3 (1.9) 2.0 (1.8) 1.6 (2.0) -0.8 (5.2)
27 1.5 (1.9) 1.2 (2.0) 1.0 (2.1) -0.5 (5.3)
28 2.5 (1.9) 1.8 (1.8) 1.0 (1.9) -3.8 (5.2)
29 2.2 (2.0) 1.6 (1.9) 1.0 (2.1) -3.0 (5.4)
30 1.7 (2.0) 1.6 (1.9) 1.5 (2.0) 0.9 (5.3)
31 2.0 (1.9) 1.1 (1.9) 0.0 (2.0) -6.5 (5.3)
32 -0.1 (1.9) -0.7 (1.8) -1.6 (2.0) -6.5 (5.2)
33 0.9 (1.9) 0.6 (1.9) 0.3 (2.0) -1.7 (5.2)
35 -0.8 (2.1) -1.0 (2.0) -1.1 (2.2) -1.9 (5.3)
36 0.5 (2.1) 0.3 (2.0) 0.0 (2.2) -1.8 (5.6)
37 -1.0 (2.2) -1.0 (2.1) -1.0 (2.3) -0.8 (5.4)
38 1.1 (2.1) 1.0 (2.1) 0.8 (2.2) -0.3 (5.2)
39 2.2 (2.2) 2.0 (2.1) 1.9 (2.2) 0.9 (5.2)
40 2.7 (2.2) 2.3 (2.1) 1.8 (2.2) -0.8 (5.1)
41 0.2 (2.2) 0.1 (2.1) -0.1 (2.3) -0.8 (5.3)
42 -0.6 (2.3) -0.4 (2.2) 0.0 (2.3) 2.0 (5.3)
Pooled: 24-33 1.5 (1.3) 1.0 (1.2) 0.5 (1.4) -2.6 (4.5)
Pooled: 35-42 0.5 (1.8) 0.4 (1.7) 0.3 (1.9) -0.4 (4.8)
Notes: Estimated coecients times 100 (with standard errors in parentheses) from models t separately by age to wages of conscripts and non-conscripts.
All models include dummies for education as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use
as dependent variable wage at indicated age, minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus
4.16 times wage at age 20/21. Pooled estimates use sample of available person-year observations, and include year dummies. Standard errors for pooled
models are clustered by person. Source: Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Table 4a: Robustness Checks: Estimated Wage Effects of Conscription at Pooled Ages 35-42 from Alternative
Models (Pooled Education Groups)
OLS Model with No OLS Model Including Dierenced Model: Quasi-Dierenced Model:
Control for Wage at Control for Wage at Wage Minus Wage at Wage Minus 4.16 x Wage at
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21
Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std.
Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a) Baseline sample 2.1 (1.2) 2.1 (1.2) 2.0 (1.3) 1.9 (3.5)
conscripts=1,838
non-conscripts=4,911
b) Relax full-time 2.6 (1.2) 2.6 (1.2) 2.6 (1.3) 2.7 (3.4)
conscripts=2,015
non-conscripts=5,775
c) Relax leave in 1989 2.1 (1.1) 2.8 (1.1) 3.8 (1.2) 9.2 (3.1)
conscripts=2,600
non-conscripts=4,911
d) Impose full-time 1987 3.0 (1.4) 2.6 (1.3) 1.9 (1.5) -1.7 (3.9)
conscripts=1,370
non-conscripts=4,911
e) Adjust 1987 wages 2.1 (1.2) 1.5 (1.2) 0.6 (1.3) -3.9 (3.5)
conscripts=1,838
non-conscripts=4,911
Notes: In the baseline sample, conscripts include men who were working full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989, plus men who were working full
time in 1988 and on leave in 1989. Non-conscripted men are those who were working full time in 1988 and 1989. Sample in row b replaces full time work
requirements for both groups with requirement that the individual be working and have a valid wage. In this sample 95 conscripts and 352 non-conscripts
have missing education data: models include a dummy for missing initial education. Sample in row c modies conscript denition to include men who
were working full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988, plus men who were working full time in 1988 and on leave in 1989, thus dropping the requirement
that the men who worked full time in 1987 were also on leave in 1989. Sample in row d modies conscript denition to include men who were working full
time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989, plus men who were working full time in both 1987 and 1988 and on leave in 1989, thus limiting the second
group to those who were working full time in both 1987 and 1988. Sample in row e is same as baseline. However, wages of conscripts who were working
full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989 are inated by 7.15%. Estimated coecients times 100 (with standard errors in parentheses). All models
include dummies for year and education as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use as
dependent variable wage at indicated age minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus 4.16
times wage at age 20/21. Estimates use sample of available person-year observations. Standard errors are clustered by person. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Table 4b: Robustness Checks: Estimated Wage Effects of Conscription at Pooled Ages 35-42 from Alternative
Models (Low-Education Men)
OLS Model with No OLS Model Including Dierenced Model: Quasi-Dierenced Model:
Control for Wage at Control for Wage at Wage Minus Wage at Wage Minus 4.16 x Wage at
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21
Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std.
Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a) Baseline sample 4.1 (1.7) 4.1 (1.6) 4.3 (1.8) 4.8 (5.0)
conscripts=821
non-conscripts=2,675
b) Relax full-time 4.7 (1.6) 4.7 (1.5) 4.7 (1.7) 4.6 (4.9)
conscripts=850
non-conscripts=2,999
c) Relax leave in 1989 3.8 (1.4) 4.6 (1.4) 6.2 (1.5) 13.6 (4.3)
conscripts=1,187
non-conscripts=2,675
d) Impose full-time 1987 5.4 (1.9) 5.1 (1.9) 4.5 (2.1) 1.7 (5.7)
conscripts=608
non-conscripts=2,675
e) Adjust 1987 wages 4.1 (1.7) 3.7 (1.6) 2.8 (1.7) -1.3 (5.0)
conscripts=821
non-conscripts=2,675
Notes: In the baseline sample, conscripts include men who were working full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989, plus men who were working full
time in 1988 and on leave in 1989. Non-conscripted men are those who were working full time in 1988 and 1989. Sample in row b replaces full time work
requirements for both groups with requirement that the individual be working and have a valid wage. In this sample 95 conscripts and 352 non-conscripts
have missing education data: models include a dummy for missing initial education. Sample in row c modies conscript denition to include men who
were working full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988, plus men who were working full time in 1988 and on leave in 1989, thus dropping the requirement
that the men who worked full time in 1987 were also on leave in 1989. Sample in row d modies conscript denition to include men who were working full
time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989, plus men who were working full time in both 1987 and 1988 and on leave in 1989, thus limiting the second
group to those who were working full time in both 1987 and 1988. Sample in row e is same as baseline. However, wages of conscripts who were working
full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989 are inated by 7.15%. Estimated coecients times 100 (with standard errors in parentheses). All models
include dummies for year and education as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use as
dependent variable wage at indicated age minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus 4.16
times wage at age 20/21. Estimates use sample of available person-year observations. Standard errors are clustered by person. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Table 4c: Robustness Checks: Estimated Wage Effects of Conscription at Pooled Ages 35-42 from Alternative
Models (High-Education Men)
OLS Model with No OLS Model Including Dierenced Model: Quasi-Dierenced Model:
Control for Wage at Control for Wage at Wage Minus Wage at Wage Minus 4.16 x Wage at
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21
Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std. Conscription Std.
Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error Eect Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a) Baseline sample 0.5 (1.8) 0.4 (1.7) 0.3 (1.9) -0.4 (4.8)
conscripts=1,017
non-conscripts=2,236
b) Relax full-time 0.6 (1.7) 1.0 (1.7) 1.0 (1.8) 1.2 (4.6)
conscripts=1,070
non-conscripts=2,424
c) Relax leave in 1989 0.7 (1.6) 1.2 (1.6) 1.9 (1.7) 5.5 (4.3)
conscripts=1,413
non-conscripts=2,236
d) Impose full-time 1987 1.2 (1.9) 0.6 (1.9) -0.1 (2.0) -4.2 (5.2)
conscripts=762
non-conscripts=2,236
e) Adjust 1987 wages 0.5 (1.8) -0.1 (1.7) -1.0 (1.9) -5.9 (4.8)
conscripts=1,017
non-conscripts=2,236
Notes: In the baseline sample, conscripts include men who were working full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989, plus men who were working full
time in 1988 and on leave in 1989. Non-conscripted men are those who were working full time in 1988 and 1989. Sample in row b replaces full time work
requirements for both groups with requirement that the individual be working and have a valid wage. In this sample 95 conscripts and 352 non-conscripts
have missing education data: models include a dummy for missing initial education. Sample in row c modies conscript denition to include men who
were working full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988, plus men who were working full time in 1988 and on leave in 1989, thus dropping the requirement
that the men who worked full time in 1987 were also on leave in 1989. Sample in row d modies conscript denition to include men who were working full
time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989, plus men who were working full time in both 1987 and 1988 and on leave in 1989, thus limiting the second
group to those who were working full time in both 1987 and 1988. Sample in row e is same as baseline. However, wages of conscripts who were working
full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989 are inated by 7.15%. Estimated coecients times 100 (with standard errors in parentheses). All models
include dummies for year and education as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use as
dependent variable wage at indicated age minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus 4.16
times wage at age 20/21. Estimates use sample of available person-year observations. Standard errors are clustered by person. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Table 5: Change in Education
All Low-Education High-Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conscription Dummy 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.26 0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Schooling at Age 20/21:




Completed Elementary 0.30 0.31
(6 years) (0.12) (0.10)
Completed Intermediate Level 0.29 0.30
(9 years) (0.14) (0.12)
Mean 0.77 1.04 0.50
Standard Deviation 1.68 1.86 1.43
Obs. 4,903 2,459 2,444
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes conscripts and nonconscripts who were observed working as a wage earner in the QP
at least once between 2002 and 2009. Dependent variable is change in schooling from last observed value (in 2002-2009 period) to initial value
at age 20/21. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Table 6: Estimated Wage Effects of Conscription at Ages 35-42
Add Add Add Add Add Add
Current Current Current City Firm All
Baseline Education Occupation Industry Eects Size Controls
(5 dummies) (22 dummies) (23 dummies) (2 dummies)
(2) (3) (5) (4) (6) (7)
1. Overall sample
estimated enlistment eect 2.1 1.6 0.6 1.4 2.1 1.8 0.9
(1.2) (1.2) (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.1) (1.0)
Obs. 29,034 29,034 28,908 29,034 29,034 29,034 28,908
R2 0.258 0.279 0.356 0.318 0.277 0.315 0.453
F statistic 107.471 84.909 72.11 64.888 103.997 134.663 80.045
2. Low Education at Age 20/21
estimated enlistment eect 4.1 3.4 2.4 3.5 4.3 4.2 3.1
(1.6) (1.5) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.5) (1.3)
Obs. 14,119 14,119 14,060 14,119 14,119 14,119 14,060
R2 0.054 0.069 0.157 0.13 0.07 0.123 0.271
F statistic 25.904 20.383 22.001 21.259 25.123 39.711 30.634
3. Higher Education at Age 20/21
estimated enlistment eect 0.4 0.2 -0.7 -0.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.9
(1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (1.4)
Obs. 14,915 14,915 14,848 14,915 14,915 14,915 14,848
R2 0.227 0.254 0.342 0.292 0.251 0.29 0.452
F statistic 59.165 52.126 39.94 35.513 58.099 79.177 54.251
Note: Estimated coecients times 100 (with standard errors in parentheses). The baseline specication includes controls for year (7 dummies),
education as of age 20 or 21 (5 dummies) and wage measured at age 20 or 21. Estimates use sample of available person-year observations.
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cohort 1967, males
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cohort 1967, females
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not empl. priv. sector on leave
full−timer part−timer











18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
cohort 1977, females
not empl. priv. sector on leave
full−timer part−timer











18 19 20 21 22
cohort 1987, males
not empl. priv. sector on leave
full−timer part−timer











18 19 20 21 22
cohort 1987, females
not empl. priv. sector on leave
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owner unpaid family, etc
Note: For the 1967 cohort (rst row), military enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 (thus
observed the year before, at age 20 or 19 depending on the date of birth) and service lasted for 24 months;
for the 1977 cohort (second row), enlistment was due the year the individual turned 20 and service lasted for
4 months; for the 1987 cohort (third row), military enlistment had been abolished and the plot is conditional
on working full-time the year the individual turned 20. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS
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Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).
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20 25 30 35 40
age
conscripted not conscripted
c. cohort 1967, males, higher school.
Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time in1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the years
military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full-time during the years
military enlistment is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the individual




















25 30 35 40 45
age
conscripted not conscripted



















25 30 35 40 45
age
conscripted not conscripted



















25 30 35 40 45
age
conscripted not conscripted
c. cohort 1967, males higher sch.
Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time the year before military enlistment is due, and reported
on leave during the years military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working
full-time during the years military enlistment would have been due. For the cohort born 1967, military
enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Figure 6: Estimated impact of enlistment at ages 35-42, quasi-differencing wage re-







































































































































c. high education men
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).